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Humans show a natural tendency to discount bad news while in-
corporating good news into beliefs (the “good news–bad news
effect”), an effect that may help explain seemingly irrational risk
taking. Understanding how this bias develops with age is impor-
tant because adolescents are prone to engage in risky behavior;
thus, educating them about danger is crucial. We reveal a striking
valence-dependent asymmetry in how belief updating develops
with age. In the ages tested (9–26 y), younger age was associated
with inaccurate updating of beliefs in response to undesirable in-
formation regarding vulnerability. In contrast, the ability to up-
date beliefs accurately in response to desirable information
remained relatively stable with age. This asymmetry was medi-
ated by adequate computational use of positive but not negative
estimation errors to alter beliefs. The results are important for
understanding how belief formation develops and might help ex-
plain why adolescents do not respond adequately to warnings.
decision making | learning | optimism
Human decision making is markedly inﬂuenced by beliefs ofwhat might occur in the future. We form and update those
beliefs based on information we receive from the world around
us. However, even when we are presented with accurate in-
formation, cognitive biases and heuristics restrict our ability to
make adequate adjustments to our prior beliefs (1–5).
One such bias, with important implications for well-being, is
the human tendency to discount bad news. For instance, high-
lighting previously unknown risk factors for diseases is surpris-
ingly ineffective at altering an individual’s perception of their
medical vulnerability (6). On the other hand, when people are
informed that they are less at risk for encountering adverse
events (e.g., car accidents or a sport injury) than they previously
thought, they will alter their beliefs appropriately (7). One may
view this process as a greater tendency to use priors as an anchor
(1) when subsequent information is undesirable vs. desirable. It
has also been suggested that this bias can exist because the
computational and neural processes that govern learning from
good and bad information are partially separable (7–10). When
receiving desirable news (such as learning that they are more
attractive than they imagined), people tend to integrate this in-
formation in a Bayesian manner (8). However, upon receiving
undesirable news, people’s posterior beliefs are noisy and deviate
from Bayesian predictions, discounting the strength of the signal
they receive (8). If altering beliefs in response to desirable and
undesirable information is mediated by partially distinguish-
able mechanisms, they may also have different development
trajectories.
Understanding how the ability to alter beliefs about vulnera-
bility develops with age is of great importance because adoles-
cents are especially prone to engage in risky and dangerous
behavior (11, 12). This can lead to grave outcomes. Indeed, the
primary cause of adolescent mortality in the Western world is
from accidents related to risk taking (13, 16). It is therefore
critical to educate adolescents about risk and inform them of the
likelihoods of unwanted outcomes.
When communicating risk, however, we must take into ac-
count the many changes in information processing and memory
that take place in childhood and adolescence (for review, see
refs. 17 and 18). For example, both gist and verbatim memory
improve during development, with the former improving more
rapidly (ref. 19; see ref. 18 for implications for policy). However,
we do not know whether children and teenagers incorporate
facts into prior beliefs in a valence-dependent manner. If they
do, then this bias may be one of the reasons why campaigns
targeted at adolescents that highlight the dangers of careless
driving (20), unprotected sex (21), and alcohol and drug abuse
(22) have limited impact. A prominent explanation for this
limitation is that the obtained knowledge fails to alter sub-
sequent behavior due to competing emotional and social factors
that inﬂuence action (23). In younger individuals, emotional
factors are especially likely to inﬂuence action because brain
systems involved in emotion regulation and cognitive control
have yet to mature (24, 25). However, increased emotional in-
ﬂuence may bias not only action selection but also the mecha-
nism by which information is integrated into existing beliefs.
Here we test whether the ability to alter beliefs in response to
good and bad news develops differently with age. To that end, 59
volunteers between the ages of 9 and 26 were tested on the belief
update task (7, 26). They estimated their likelihood of experi-
encing 40 adverse life events (e.g., passenger in a car accident or
home burglary). After each trial, participants were presented
with the actual frequency of that event in their representative
population (Fig. 1A). Participants were then asked in a second
session to reestimate their likelihoods for all life events. This
enabled us to quantify how participants adjust their beliefs in
response to new information in two instances: (i) when they
learn that the average likelihood of encountering a negative life
event is lower than their own estimate (good news; Fig. 1B) and
(ii) when it is greater (bad news; Fig. 1C).
Formal models suggest that learning from information that
disconﬁrms one’s expectations is mediated by a prediction error
signal that quantiﬁes a difference between expectation and out-
come (27). We have previously shown that an analogous mech-
anism underpins belief updating in this task (7). Speciﬁcally, the
difference between participants’ initial estimations and the in-
formation provided (that is, estimation error = estimation −
probability presented) predicts subsequent updates, as would
be expected from learning models (27). The strength of this
association is indicative of learning. In adults, such learning is
valence-dependent, being greater for information that offers
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an opportunity to adopt a more optimistic outlook than for
information that calls for a more pessimistic outlook (7). If
children and adolescents exhibit an even stronger bias, they
may be particularly compromised at integrating undesirable in-
formation, such as that provided by health and safety campaigns,
into their beliefs.
Results
Learning from Good and Bad News. Our results revealed a marked
asymmetry in how belief updating develops with age. Trials were
divided into ones in which participants received desirable in-
formation (i.e., the probability presented was better than the
estimate of their own probability; Fig. 1B) or undesirable in-
formation (i.e., the probability presented was worse; Fig. 1C).
For each trial, an estimation error (estimation error = estimation −
probability presented) and an update term were calculated (for
desirable trials, update = ﬁrst estimation − second estimation;
for undesirable trials, update = second estimation − ﬁrst esti-
mation). For each participant we then calculated the correlation
between estimation errors and subsequent updates across trials,
which was the learning score.
Although participants learned from the information presented
to them [mean Pearson correlation between an individual’s es-
timation errors and update was signiﬁcantly different from 0;
t(51) = 26.6, P < 0.001], their ability to do so was differentially
related to age as a function of valence. Speciﬁcally, the younger
the participant, the worse they were at appropriately adjusting
beliefs about the future in response to undesirable informa-
tion, but the ability to adjust beliefs appropriately in response
to desirable information did not alter signiﬁcantly within the age
range tested (Fig. 2A). This was evident from a positive corre-
lation between age and learning scores in trials when participants
received bad news (r = 0.42, P < 0.005) and no correlation be-
tween age and learning scores when receiving good news (r =
0.21, P > 0.1).
As demonstrated in Fig. 2 B and C, learning scores are cal-
culated by quantifying the relationship, on a trial-by-trial basis
for each participant, between an estimation error and sub-
sequent update [as done previously (7)]. The resulting Pearson
correlation coefﬁcient makes up the learning score. This score,
however, could be affected by a restricted range in the predictor
and/or criterion (e.g., if the range of the predictor happens to be
smaller in younger participants, this may artiﬁcially produce an
association between age and learning scores). Thus, we adjusted
the correlations reported above to control for the SD and mean
of the two variables that make up the learning score: the initial
estimation error (predictor) and subsequent update (criterion).
After controlling for these factors, partial correlation coefﬁcients
conﬁrmed a positive relationship between age and learning from
bad news (r = 0.45, P = 0.001) and no correlation between age
and learning from good news (r = 0.11, P > 0.4). The partial
correlation between age and learning from bad news was sig-
niﬁcantly greater than the partial correlation between age and
learning from good news (Steiger’s Z = 1.97, P < 0.05).
Thus, reduced accurate learning from undesirable information
about future likelihoods in late childhood/adolescence could not
simply be explained by a general improvement of learning ability
with age. Notably, the results cannot be explained by younger
participants not understanding the task or having problems with
calculating probabilities. This is because they performed exactly
the same task in trials when they received good news and in trials
when they received bad news. However, reduced accurate
learning was more strongly associated with younger age for bad
news trials than for good news trials.
For completeness, we also separately examined the correlation
between age and the SD and mean of the criterion and predictor
that make up the learning score (Fig. 3A). We found that the SD
of the initial estimation error (i.e., the tendency to underestimate
or overestimate one’s likelihoods relative to the average pop-
ulation) did not correlate with age (for the undesirable trials, r =
0.12, P > 0.3; for the desirable trials, r = −0.09, P > 0.5).
However, the SD of the update correlated negatively with age
(for the undesirable trials, r = −0.44, P = 0.001; for the desirable
trials, r = −0.24, P = 0.09). In other words, a positive correlation
between age and learning from bad news was observed despite
the range in update being smaller with increasing age. There was
no signiﬁcant relationship between age and the initial estimation
Fig. 1. Paradigm. (A) In each trial, participants
were presented with a short description of 1 of 40
adverse events and asked to estimate how likely this
event was to occur to them. They were then pre-
sented with the average probability of that event
occurring. The second session was the same as the
ﬁrst except that the average probability of the
event to occur was not presented. Examples of trials
for which the participant’s estimate was (B) higher
or (C) lower than the average probability. Here, for
illustration purposes only, the blue and red frames
denote the participant’s response (either an over-
estimation or underestimation, respectively), and
the blue and red ﬁlled boxes denote information
that calls for an adjustment in (B) a desirable or (C)
an undesirable direction.
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error (for the undesirable trials, r = 0.048, P = 0.74; for the
desirable trials, r = −0.25, P = 0.076), nor with the amount of
accurate update (for the undesirable trials, r = −0.22, P > 0.1; for
the desirable trials, r = 0.052, P > 0.5). These last ﬁndings suggest
that although the magnitude of the estimates and the updating of
those estimates are relatively stable in the age range tested, for
younger subjects the amount of update was less precisely asso-
ciated with the undesirable information received.
Valence-Dependent Effects on the Development of Learning Cannot
Be Explained by Priors, Memory, Past Experience, Negativity, Familiarity,
or Reaction Times. To examine whether the relationship between age
and learning could be explained by any other factor, we tested for
a correlation between age and all other variables recorded (Fig. 3A).
We do not perform corrections for multiple comparisons because
the aim of these analyses was to identify potential confounding
factors; thus, by not using Bonferroni corrections, our analyses
are more stringent.
Prior beliefs. An important question is whether subjects’ prior
beliefs of vulnerability differed across the ages tested. Consistent
with previous ﬁndings (28), subjects perceived themselves as slightly
less likely than their subpopulation to encounter harm. Speciﬁ-
cally, their priors (i.e., pre-news estimation of likelihoods) ten-
ded to be slightly lower than the population statistics [t(51) =
1.83, P = 0.07]. However, there was no signiﬁcant relationship
between age and priors [for the undesirable trials, r = −0.09, P =
0.5, and for the desirable trials, r = −0.17, P = 0.24; these cor-
relations did not differ from each other (P = 0.7)]. In other
words, younger individuals did not have more of an optimistic
prior than older individuals. This is consistent with previous
studies (29, 30) and runs contrary to the belief that children/ado-
lescents perceive themselves as less vulnerable than adults do (31).
Note that we only elicited one number for each stimulus that rep-
resents the subjects’ prior. The shape of the distribution from which
this number is taken is unknown.
Memory. Memory is a particularly important variable because
memory for risk information is known to inﬂuence updating of
beliefs regarding vulnerability (32), and inaccurate memory
can often provide an explanation for judgment biases, as in
the case of the hindsight bias (33). Furthermore, differences in
subsequent memory can indicate attention differences during
encoding.
Thus, we conducted multiple analyses to examine whether
memory differed across age in a valence-dependent manner.
Memory errors correlated with age for both desirable and un-
desirable trials (for the desirable trials, r = −0.40, P = 0.003; for
the undesirable trials, r = −0.39, P = 0.004). However, these
correlations did not differ from each other (Z = 0.08, P > 0.5).
Second, for each stimulus we calculated the correlation be-
tween memory and age and then excluded stimuli for which the
two were signiﬁcantly correlated (six stimuli were excluded).
Removing these stimuli ensured that memory was no longer
correlated with age (for the good news, r = 0.08, P > 0.5, and for
the bad news, r = −0.05, P > 0.5; Z = 0.05, P > 0.5). We then
repeated the main analysis without these stimuli and replicated
our previous results: there was a positive correlation between age
and learning from bad news (partial correlation controlling for
magnitude and the variance of estimation error and update; r =
0.43, P = 0.003) but no correlation between age and learning
from good news (partial correlation as above; r = 0.059, P > 0.7),
and the two correlations were signiﬁcantly different from each
other (Z = 2.15, P < 0.05). This further suggests that the valence-
dependent asymmetry in learning does not result from age dif-
ferences in memory for the information presented.
Third, to directly examine the effect of memory for the pre-
sented information on updating of beliefs, we conducted an
analysis relating the two. Speciﬁcally, for each subject we cor-
related across trials the accuracy of the subject’s memory for the
information given (i.e., memory errors; Materials and Methods)
with their updating of risk estimates. As expected, the two were
signiﬁcantly correlated [t(51) = 4.32, P < 0.001]. However, the
relationship between them did not alter with age (for the good
news trials, r = 0.004, P = 0.98; for the bad news trials, r =
−0.059, P = 0.68), and the two correlations did not differ from
each other (Z = 0.3, P > 0.5). Thus, although the relationship
between memory and updating is signiﬁcant, it does not alter
with age in a valence-dependent manner.
Other variables. There was no signiﬁcant correlation between age
and past experience with the events (for the undesirable trials,
r = 0.04, P = 0.77; for the desirable trials, r = 0.04, P = 0.78), nor
with how negative the events were perceived to be [for the un-
desirable trials, r = 0.02, P = 0.89, and for the desirable trials, r =
−0.14, P = 0.34; these last two correlations were, however,
signiﬁcantly different from each other (P < 0.05)], nor with
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Fig. 2. Relationship between age and learning from
good and bad news. (A) Correlation across subjects
between age and learning from good and bad news
(i.e., trials for which the information presented was
better or worse than expected). (B and C) Learning
is deﬁned as the correlation between estimation
errors and update across trials for each subject. Data
from two subjects demonstrate this association for
trials in which the subject received good news (thus,
estimation errors are positive) and trials in which
the subject received bad news (thus, estimation
errors are negative). The slope of each line is the
learning score of that subject. In this example,
learning from bad news is worse than learning from
good news in the younger participant but does not
differ as much for the older participant.
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depression scores (r = −0.088, P = 0.56). For both desirable and
undesirable trials, age correlated signiﬁcantly with reaction times
(for the undesirable trials, r = −0.56, P = 0.0001; for the desir-
able trials, r = −0.60, P = 0.0001) and familiarity ratings (for the
undesirable trials, r = 0.35, P = 0.011; for the desirable trials, r =
0.38, P = 0.007). The younger the participant, the slower the
reaction times, and the less likely the participant was to be fa-
miliar with the stimuli presented.
Controlling for all relevant variables independently and together. To
control for the variables that were found to be related to de-
velopment, when examining the correlation between learning
from bad news and age, we ﬁrst controlled for each variable
separately by conducting multiple partial correlation analyses.
The results, displayed in Table S1, show that the relationship
between learning from bad news and age remained signiﬁcant in
all these cases and also when controlling for gender.
Second, we conducted a hierarchical linear regression (Fig.
3B). Learning from undesirable information was entered as the
dependent measure. In the ﬁrst block of predictors (i.e., in-
dependent measures) we controlled for variables that were most
likely to inﬂuence the learning score. The learning score was
calculated as the relationship between update and estimation
error, and thus, we ﬁrst controlled for the magnitude and SD
of these two variables (block 1). Next, we controlled for in-
dependent variables that were found to be related to age
(memory, familiarity, and reaction time; block 2). In the third
block we controlled for a variable that was not related to age but
theoretically important for the investigation, learning from good
news (this was entered to show again that the association be-
tween age and learning is speciﬁc to undesirable trials; block 3).
Finally, after controlling for all these variables, we asked whether
age can explain any additional variance in learning from bad
news (block 4). We found that age accounted for additional
variance in learning from undesirable information over and
above all other predictors [R2change = 0:064; Fchange ð1;41Þ = 4:63;
P = 0:037]. The results show that even after controlling for all
these additional variables, the relationship between age and
learning from undesirable information remains signiﬁcant (Beta =
0.38, P < 0.05). Learning from desirable information did not
provide additional explanatory variance in predicting learning
from undesirable information [R2change = 0:018; Fchange ð1;41Þ =
1:18;P = 0:28]. This highlights the possibility that differential
processes may be at play when adjusting beliefs in response to
good and bad news.
Discussion
Our results reveal that the ability to alter beliefs of vulnerability
appropriately in response to new information develops in a va-
lence-dependent manner. Younger age was associated with in-
accurate learning from information suggesting that the future is
bleaker than expected, whereas the ability to learn from in-
formation suggesting that the future is brighter than expected
was stable by comparison. Speciﬁcally, accurate updating in re-
sponse to bad news improved linearly with development in the
age range tested but stayed relatively constant in response to
good news. This may be one factor that explains why adolescents
can be especially resistant to warnings about danger: they have
greater difﬁculty in learning from bad news than do adults.
The valence-dependent effects on learning were speciﬁc to
integrating information regarding one’s own risk, rather than
learning about risk in the general population. In particular,
memory for average risk in the population improved with age in
a similar manner for desirable and undesirable information.
Thus, although memory accuracy alters with age, which may also
indicate changes in attention to the information provided, these
changes were not valence-dependent. Furthermore, the tendency
to overestimate or underestimate vulnerability did not alter with
development, and the participants’ prior beliefs were stable
across age. The quantitative amount by which participants
updated their beliefs in response to desirable or undesirable
information did not alter with age, either. What did alter with
age was the degree to which the amount of update was pro-
portional to the error made, but only when the error called for an
adjustment in a negative direction. Thus, when receiving nega-
tive information, younger individuals appeared to adjust their
beliefs in a seemingly random manner, which was dispropor-
tionate to the data in front of them. This may result in inaccurate
beliefs. For example, a young individual might assign enhanced
weight for relatively low risk factors (i.e., noninvasive physical
contact with an HIV-positive person) and reduced weight for
high-risk factors (i.e., unprotected sex with a non-HIV carrier,
A
B
Fig. 3. Controlling for other variables. (A) Each bar
represents the magnitude of the Pearson correlation
coefﬁcient (r) between that variable and age. Bars
are plotted separately for good news trials and bad
news trials. For learning, bars represent partial cor-
relation coefﬁcients that control for the magnitude
and standard division across trials of the two factors
that compose the learning score (i.e., corrected
learning score); these differed signiﬁcantly between
good and bad news trials. Lower asterisks represent
factors that showed a signiﬁcant correlation with
age for either good or bad news. (B) These factors
were entered in a hierarchical regression model
explaining learning from bad news. The four blocks
correspond to the order of the variables that were
entered. First, we controlled for the magnitude and
SD of the two factors that compose the learning
score (block 1); then, we controlled for any addi-
tional variable that correlated with age (block 2);
next, we controlled for learning from good news
(block 3); and ﬁnally, we introduced age (block 4).
Betas are plotted after the ﬁnal block is entered.
Age signiﬁcantly accounted for additional variance
in learning from bad news over and above all other
predictors. *P < 0.05; n.s., no signiﬁcant difference
between bars.
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which can result in unwanted pregnancy and sexually transmitted
diseases), resulting in suboptimal decision making.
It is important to note that our results relate to the ability to
adjust beliefs in response to information about possible future
likelihoods. Such information is relatively unconstrained and
open to interpretation. Slow development of learning from un-
desirable information may be restricted to such cases, and we do
not know whether it will generalize to instances where outcomes
are experienced (such as experienced punishments or losses). In
fact, there is evidence that younger individuals exhibit better
Pavlovian reversal learning from punishment than reward (34)
but do better at adjusting behavior in response to positive feed-
back than negative feedback in an instrumental learning task
(35–38). Furthermore, the likelihoods presented in the current
study were related mostly to physical danger. It is possible that
the ability to adjust beliefs regarding social outcomes, for ex-
ample, has a different developmental trajectory, which might
also differ between genders.
The relative tendency in late childhood/early adolescence not
to adjust beliefs accurately in response to negative information
may be related to the developmental of the frontal cortex. We
have previously reported that people who show activity in the
right inferior frontal gyrus, which closely tracks unexpected
negative errors in this task, are more likely to update their beliefs
accordingly (7). In contrast, adjustments in response to positive
information in this task were supported not only by frontal
regions but also by nonfrontal regions (7). In other words,
a larger network of regions was sensitive to positive estimation
errors, rendering learning from desirable information less sus-
ceptible to maturation of a particular region.
It has also been shown that the ability to adjust beliefs in this
task is modulated by dopamine (39). The dopaminergic system
undergoes substantial changes during the age range tested here
(12, 40). These changes may have a signiﬁcant effect on the
process by which beliefs are adjusted in response to good and
bad news, although the exact mechanism is unknown and likely
to be complex. Cohen et al. (41), for example, have shown that
neural prediction error signals to rewards in the striatum peak in
adolescence. This may underlie the accurate computational use
of positive estimation errors in adolescence observed here.
It is of interest to examine the developmental trajectory of
learning from bad news beyond young adulthood into late
adulthood. Both dopamine and frontal lobe function alter as we
age (42), and valence-dependent effects on information pro-
cessing and decision making have been demonstrated with aging.
For example, it has been shown that younger adults have a neg-
ativity bias in attending to information relative to older adults
(43) and are more inclined to pursue knowledge, whereas the
elderly focus more on emotional satisfaction and meaning
[known as the socioemotional selectivity theory (44)]. Such dif-
ferences in goals and attention result in distinct effects of posi-
tive and negative mood on risk taking in younger and older
adults (45). Thus, learning from bad news may follow an inverse
U shape across the life span, peaking in young adulthood and
declining with old age.
The asymmetry in the development of accurate learning from
negative and positive information may be in accord with both the
need for exploration in late childhood and adolescence and the
heightened risk taking in that age group (11, 12). Indeed, ex-
ploratory behavior, which is important for acquiring new skills
and independence, may involve taking a certain amount of risk
(12). However, it can also result in aversive outcomes, which is
why vast resources have been dedicated to educating adolescents
about the consequences of their risky behavior (20–22). Our
results show that this approach may be inherently limited be-
cause the ability to appropriately adjust beliefs about vulnera-
bility in response to undesirable information develops dispropor-
tionally late between late childhood and adulthood. However,
reframing the information to highlight positive outcomes of de-
sired behaviors (e.g., the positive effect of reduced alcohol con-
sumption on sports performance), rather than dangers of undesired
ones, may have a larger impact (18, 46).
Materials and Methods
Participants. Fifty-nine volunteers (ages 9–26, 33 females) were recruited via
a University College London Web site and the Science Museum in London.
See Table S2 for age distribution. Participants gave informed consent and
were compensated for their time. The study was approved by the University
College London Research Ethics Committee.
Participants completed the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI) scale. It has
been shown that depressed individuals tend to overestimate the likelihood of
encountering negative events, such as those included in our study (47), in
their lives. Thus, to control for this, we excluded subjects with BDI scores
higher than 12. For participants younger than 18 y of age the BDI was re-
vised such that one question regarding sexual behavior was excluded, and
the score was adjusted accordingly. Four participants failed to complete the
BDI. Seven participants with known health conditions and/or with BDI scores
higher than 12 were excluded from the analysis (three adults and four
adolescents), leaving 52 participants in the analysis.
Stimuli. Forty short descriptions of negative life events (e.g., passenger in a car
accident or home burglary; Table S3) were presented in random order. All
events were shown to all participants. Because of the developmental nature
of the current study we used events that were associated with comparable
likelihoods across age. This was veriﬁed to the best of our ability by online
resources (as indicated below) and by a medical doctor [we note that
medical doctors are themselves subject to biases and errors when reporting
risk statistics (e.g., ref. 48)]. For each adverse event the average probability
of that event occurring at least once was calculated from data compiled
from online resources (including the Ofﬁce for National Statistics and
PubMed; see Table S4 for a list of online resources). Very rare or very com-
mon events were not included; all events probabilities lay between 10% and
70%. To ensure that the range of possible overestimation was equal to the
range of possible underestimation, participants were told that the range of
probabilities lay between 3% and 77%.
Procedure. The paradigm was adapted from our previous studies (7, 26,
39). Participants completed a practice session before beginning the
main experiment.
In each trial, 1 of 40 adverse life events was presented for 3 s, and par-
ticipants were asked to estimate how likely the event was to happen to them
in the future. Participants had up to 8 s to respond. They were then presented
with the actuarial frequency of the event in a demographically similar
population for 2 s (Fig. 1).
In a second session, immediately after the ﬁrst, participants were asked
again to provide estimates of their likelihood of encountering the same
events so that we could assess how they updated their estimate in response to
the information presented. Participants then rated all stimuli on prior ex-
perience [for the question “Has this event happened to you before?” the
responses ranged from 1 (never) to 6 (very often)], familiarity [for the
question “Regardless if this event has happened to you before, how familiar
do you feel it is to you from TV, friends, movies, and so on?” the responses
ranged from 1 (not at all familiar) to 6 (very familiar)], and negativity [for
the question “How negative would this event be for you?” the responses
ranged from 1 (not negative at all) to 6 (very negative)].
To test memory for the information presented, subjects were asked at the
end to provide the actual probability previously presented of each event.
Memory errors were calculated as the absolute difference between the
probability previously presented and the participants’ recollection of that
statistic:
memory error  =   jactual probability presented
− recollection of probability presentedj: [1]
To ensure that the younger participants had a basic understanding of per-
centages, they were asked to complete two separate tasks before they began
the experiment. First, they completed 10 trials in which they were presented
with 100 cartoon faces, some of them yellow and some red. They were asked
to identify the percentage of red faces out of three possible answers. Fol-
lowing this task the experimenter asked each participant to indicate which of
two percentages was larger or smaller. Only one participant did not suc-
cessfully complete all trials in both tasks and thus was not given the main task
to complete.
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Data Analysis. Trials were divided into ones in which participants received
desirable information [i.e., the probability presented was lower than the
estimate of their own probability (Fig. 1B)] or undesirable information [i.e.,
the probability presented was higher (Fig. 1C)]. For each trial an estimation
error (estimation error = estimation − probability presented) and an update
term were calculated (for desirable trials, update = ﬁrst estimation − second
estimation; for undesirable trials, update = second estimation − ﬁrst esti-
mation). Thus, positive updates indicate a change toward the actuarial fre-
quency, and negative updates indicate a change away from the actuarial
frequency.
For each participant we calculated the strength of the association between
the estimation errors (predictor) and subsequent updates (criterion) across
trials in which participants received desirable information and separately
across trials for which they received undesirable information (see also ref. 7).
This resulted in two Pearson coefﬁcient scores for each participant. We then
examined the relationship between these scores and age to determine
whether this association is enhanced or reduced with development in the
two conditions. Because small correlation coefﬁcients can be a result of re-
striction in range in the predictor, the criterion, or both, we controlled for
the SD and mean of the criterion and predictor by adding those as variables
in a partial correlation analysis when examining the association between
age and learning.
To determine whether the association between age and learning was
different for undesirable and desirable trials, we then compared the two
resulting partial correlations using Fisher’s transformation, changing r to a Z
score, and performed a Steiger’s Z test, which examines if two correlated
correlations within a single population are different from each other. The
test compared the strength of the partial correlations between age and
learning from desirable information with the partial correlation between
age and learning from undesirable information, while taking into account
the correlation between learning from desirable information and undesir-
able information.
Next, we controlled for any additional variables that were signiﬁcantly
correlatedwith age. To that end, we tested for a correlation between age and
all stimuli ratings (ratings of familiarity, past experience, and negativity),
memory, and reaction times. This was done separately for desirable and
undesirable trials. We used a hierarchical linear regression model to test for
the strength of the association between age and learning from undesirable
information controlling for the other factors (this was not done for desirable
trials because the correlation between age and learning from desirable trials
was found not signiﬁcant).
All P values are for two-tailed hypotheses unless otherwise stated.
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